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AbstractHas Africa always been poor? This thesis attempts to answer this question, presenting
estimates of incomes in Africa from 1796 onwards. I build upon the work of Prados de la
Escosura, who exploited the relationship between GDP per capita and income terms of trade
to create African GDP estimates from 1870 to 1950. I produce new estimates, which are both
of a higher quality and more extensive. My regional estimates go back as far as 1796 and the
majority of my country estimates go back to 1830. Outside of South Africa, this is the rst
insight into the incomes in sub-Saharan Africa during this period. I nd two interesting results.
The rst, that there was an economic boom in West and East Africa immediately prior to the
scramble for Africa. The second, more surprising result, is that GDP per capita levels rise prior
to 1840. I demonstrate how this contradicts previous literature and highlight how both of these
booms were triggered primarily by the many structural changes which occurred during and
shortly after the transatlantic slave trade. Finally, I make comparisons of my GDP estimates
with the available estimates supporting the validity of my results.
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One might ask why we should attempt to measure the GDP of historical Africa. It is commonly
accepted amongst economists that GDP per capita in a Malthusian economy gravitates around
the subsistence level.1 On the contrary, there is reason to believe that GDP per capita levels in
the agricultural sector were above the subsistence level. Prados de la Escosura (2012) notes that:
"people grew taller, frequency of famines declined, markets became integrated largely because of
railway infrastructure, and new production techniques enter the market."2
North Africa is relatively well-known as being home to a number of historically advanced
countries and empires (Tolan, 2012). On more than one occasion, the region has occupied
southern-European territory in a "process fairly akin to colonialism" (Peralias, 2016); the
region is often referred to as a part of the "Western agricultural core" (Borcan, 2018). It
does, however, come to the surprise of many to know that numerous developed states existed
in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from small kingdoms to extensive empires e.g. the
Kingdom of Kush, Songhai Empire and the Abyssinian Empire to name a few - suggestive of a
more complex history of both wealth and poverty than the state of persistent impoverishment
assumed by many. Kings and emperors in West Africa exemplify the wealth of pre-colonial
sub-Saharan Africa: in the year 977 A.D., Ibn Hawqal referred to the king of Ghana as the
"richest man on earth because of his gold" (Mauny, 1954), similarly Mansa Musa, emperor of
Mali in the 14th Century, was identied as the richest person in history, according to Forbes.3
Attempts to answer the question of whether Africa has always been poor are immediately
hampered by the lack of pre-colonial written sources, furthermore, of the records that do exist,
they are seldom translated. For instance, in Timbuktu - a historically wealthy city in Mali
- there is a large collection of historical documents. These scripts were written in Ajami
(local languages written using the Arabic alphabet - the scholarly lingua franca in sub-Saharan
Islamic Africa).4 Given the lack of data, it is dicult to grasp a clear economic understanding
of Africa's economic growth, or lack thereof. Indeed, much of our current understanding of
historical Africa is based upon "guesstimates".
In this thesis, I tackle this problem, presenting estimates of GDP per capita (and total GDP)
under constant, modern-day borders.5 I do so with the purpose of painting a clearer picture
of historical Africa. To do so, I follow the methodology of Prados de la Escosura (2012), who
constructed indirect GDP estimations from 1870 to 2007, making use of the most well-documented
1Sharp (2012) shows that productivity growth in agriculture has no eect on equilibrium income under a Malthusian
framework.
2See data from the African Economic History Network for evidence on heights; a detailed analysis given by Moradi (2013).
3http://forbes.es/emprendedores/8486/asi-fue-mansa-musa-la-persona-mas-rica-de-todos-los-tiempos/
4Many of these manuscripts are currently being translated by the Ajami Project (2017-2029), however the primary focus is
on translating amulets, poems and religious texts.
5My results thus related to the respective geographical region.
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factor in Africa at the time: trade.6 I combine several datasets (some of which were released in
the last few years) to produce a dataset on terms of trade, covering the period between 1796
and 2000. Using this data, I estimate the relationship between income terms of trade and GDP
per capita between 1950 and 1990 (as established by Manning (1982), and later formalised by
Prados de la Escosura (2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013). I then exploit this relationship to produce
GDP per capita estimates from 1796 to 1900.
I improve upon the original work of Prados de la Escosura (2012) in a number of ways. Firstly,
the addition of new data, most notably that of Federico (2016), have allowed me to produce
yearly estimations as opposed to the decadal estimations given in Prados de la Escosura (2012).
Secondly, the new dataset I create based on these sources extends further back in time (to
1796) and covers more countries. Thirdly, I adjust the estimations to take into account the
transatlantic slave trade.
I nd similar results to the work of Prados de la Escosura (2012) during the 20th century: that
GDP per capita increased consistently across regions and countries until the slowdown in the
late 1980s/1990s. Going backwards into previously uncharted territory in the 19th century I
nd that the evolution of GDP per capita was far more complex. There are two periods of
particular interest. The estimations reveal that GDP per capita levels increased going back
before the 1840s. The primary cause for this was the decrease in population and increase in
export values as a result of the slave trade. The high export values implied a large inow
of money into many African economies, whilst the extraction of human capital hindered the
population growth rate. Thus, the standard assumptions of the Malthusian economy - that
population adjusts to GDP per capita gains, did not hold up in this case. As the slave trade
came to an end the economy faced a decline and stagnation period in the mid 19th century. A
large part of the continent then experienced a boom shortly prior to the "scramble for Africa".
I interpret this boom as being driven by the surge in commodity prices.7 I explain how the end
of the slave trade drove this transition, from bust to boom, and how this translated into higher
GDP per capita levels.
This paper deals solely with the estimation of GDP per capita at the time and not its distribution.
It should be noted that the resistance of many regions and individuals might have been an
impediment to growth in specic regions. Furthermore, it has been shown that the slave trade
also had negative long-term economic consequences.8 I outline the paper in the following way. In
section 2, I provide a very brief overview of methodologies used to estimate GDP per capita, in
particular in historical Africa. Section 3 describes the procedure I use to create the estimations.
I then explain the data used and present the results in sections 4 and 5, respectively. In section
6, I demonstrate the robustness of the results and in section 7 I conclude. The appendices oer
additional information which I consider secondary to the main result or to aid the reader.
6See Manning (2012) for a summary of historical datasets available in Africa.
7This provides further evidence in favour of the work of Frankema et al. (2016).
8See Diouf (2003) for accounts on this resistance and Nunn (2008) for an analysis of the trades lasting long-run impact.
2
2 MEASURING GDP IN AFRICA
In the literature there are three standard methodologies used to measure GDP, as described by
Jerven (2011a):
• Measuring GDP via Income - Enumerating prots, rents, interest, dividends, salaries and
wages.
• Measuring GDP via Expenditure - This corresponds to the consumption of nal goods.
That is the sum of: private consumption, investment, government consumption and the
balance of exports and imports.
Y = C + I + G + (X-M)
• Measuring GDP via Production - Estimates of value added production (output minus
intermediate consumption) per sector are summed together to equal GDP.
These methodologies, however, are often redundant in historical Africa, where there are few
records and the majority of income is earned in the informal rural economy. In fact, there
is a signicant lack of understanding of economic change in the African continent, even the
most recent ocial gures are criticised for their inaccuracies (Jerven (2012)). Perhaps the
most well-known and most extensive world historical datasets on GDP and population is that
produced by the Maddison project (2018).9 In the original version of this dataset, Maddison
presented African GDP estimates, the majority of which extending as far back as 1950. Since
that time, those original estimations have been updated on several occasions - they are now
more extensive and the quality of the results have been improved (Bolt, 2018). The most current
version, incorporates results from other studies, which have utilised existing records in Northern
Africa and South Africa to create and extend relatively accurate estimations. For instance, the
data from Fourie and Van Zanden (2016)is incorporated, which use national accounts in the
Cape Colony to generate relatively accurate GDP estimates from the 18th century onwards.
They nd the country to have been among the most economically prosperous - with an income
comparable to that of Europe at the time. There are few more estimations of GDP per capita in
Africa, extending before the 20th century. In North Africa, for example, Amin (1966) produced
a few benchmark years from 1880 to 1955 for Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Similarly, in Egypt,
Yousef (2002) provides a few estimations for 1886 to 1845.
In the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the most studied country has been Ghana (due to the greater
availability of historical records). By "guesstimating" the size of the traditional economy,
9See https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/
3
Rethinking Africa's GDP, 1796-1950
amongst other assumptions, Szereszewski (1965), and later Jerven (2011), create estimates of
the size of Ghana's economy going as far back as the 1880s. When evaluating the estimations
made by Jerven, Prados de la Escosura (2012) makes the following criticism:
"Why should it be assumed that consumers do not react to changes in relative prices
of goods or in their disposable income? Moreover, why should we assume that output
per head did not grow in the traditional or domestic sector?"
Rather than relying on the rather stringent assumptions of a lack of growth in the traditional
sector, and the "guesstimate" of Szereszewski (1965), Prados de la Escosura (2012) uses a
relationship between income terms of trade and GDP. This income terms of trade variable, is
better thought of as the purchasing power of imports. Its relationship with GDP per capita
growth was rst established by Manning (1982) to proxy for economic growth in Dahomey
(modern-day Benin).
A range of new and more extensive trade datasets allow me to extend and improve the work
of Prados de la Escosura (2012). This data extends further back in time - permitting me to
reach new conclusions about Africa's economic evolution. I am also able to produce yearly
data, as opposed to the decadal data he uses, doing so I capture some of the volatility which
helps to provide evidence towards the thesis presented by Jerven (2010): that Africa does not




This thesis is based upon the assumption that GDP can be approximated by income terms
of trade. I use a relatively straightforward two-step procedure of establishing a relationship
between terms of trade and GDP in modern times to create historical GDP estimations.
Several papers have noted the connection between terms of trade and GDP, for instance:
Blattman (2007), Mendoza (1997), Manning (1982) and Prados de la Escosura (2011a, 2011b,
2012a & 2013). Following the methodology used by Prados de la Escosura (2012), I establish
a relationship between income terms of trade and GDP per capita between 1950 and 1990, to
be used later on in the computation of historical estimations from 1796 onwards.
I will start by better dening the terms of trade used. Standard terms of trade measures are
generally used to measure the change in prices of exports with respect to prices of imports.
The specic terms of trade variation used by Prados de la Escosura (2012) is an adjustment of
income terms of trade (ITT). That is, it not only measures the price change, but it also captures
the change in quantities. Income terms of trade is typically dened as the total export value
over the import value. In this case, rather than using the import value, a world price index










• Pxi - Price of exports in country i.
• Xi - Quantity of exports in country i.
• Pmi - Price of imports in country i.
• Px - World price of exports
This terms of trade variable, referred hereon as ITT, is thought to be closely related to GDP.11
Given that the relationship between ITT and GDP remains constant over time, ITT can be
used to indirectly estimate GDP. (This would seem to be the case given that the estimation
coecients hold under the scrutiny of dierent specications.) 12
10As was the original intention of Manning (1982).
11Ibid.
12See gure 2 in Appendix B for a graphical representation of this relationship.
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As done by Prados de la Escosura (2012), I compute re-estimations of the regression from 1960
onwards, using this to predict GDP per capita in the 1950s (in other words I use available
data to produce out-of-sample estimations). I nd the OLS results to remain fairly constant,
furthermore, the indirect estimations appear to be relatively robust, estimating the general
trends of the 1950s well. I make a few adjustments to the specication used by Prados de la
Escosura (2012): I use modern borders to identify whether a country is coastal, which means
I can cover all countries appropriately; I also include the use of a trend variable. This trend,
or time, variable controls for a change in the nature of the relationship between ITT and GDP
per capita over time.
(3.1)
log(Y ) = β0 + β1log(ITT ) + β2logITT
2 + β3RR ∗ log(ITT ) + β4Coast ∗ log(ITT )
+ β5North+ β6UK + β7France+ β8Trend ∗ log(ITT )
, where
RR - dummy variable stating whether a country is resource rich. Takes value 1 if resource rich,
0 if not.
Coast - dummy variable stating whether a country is coastal. Takes value 1 if coastal, 0 if not.
UK - dummy variable stating whether a country was a UK colony. Takes value 1 if UK colony,
0 if not.
France - dummy variable stating whether a country was a French colony. Takes value 1 if
French colony, 0 if not.
North - dummy variable stating whether a country is in North Africa. Takes value 1 if situated
in North Africa, 0 if not.
Trend * log (ITT) - interaction term between the year and log(ITT).
After establishing this relationship between ITT and GDP per capita, and creating the dataset
on ITT (as described in the following section) GDP is then projected backwards from from
1950 Maddison (2018) levels. This is a simple procedure of simply substituting the regression
with the historical ITT values. To use similar terminology to that of Prados de la Escosura
(2012), I refer to the resulting estimates as "indirect estimates".
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4 DATA COMPILATION
In this section, I present a descriptive analysis of the data I have used to produce my estimations.
Akin to the existing literature (Prados de la Escosura 2012, 2013; Federico, 2016), I use the
export values or ITT values of neighbouring regions when data is not available for the respective
country. This assumes that the evolution of trade in both countries are similar.
GDP Per Capita Data
In accordance with Prados de la Escosura (2012) & (2013) I use post-1950 GDP estimates from
The Maddison Project (2018).
Income Terms of Trade Data
Export Values
Like Prados de la Escosura (2012, 2013), from 1950 onwards, I use export values from the IMF
(2003) CD Rom . Within the last few years the coverage and quality of historical trade estimates
have improved considerably due to research from various authors (see Federico (2016), Frankema
et al. (2018) and work from the African Economic History Network). This improvement has
allowed me to create a dataset of income terms of trade, which, at least in terms of coverage,
is far superior to that used by Prados de la Escosura (2012) - spanning over a 300 year period.
While Prados de la Escosura used Hanson (1980) and Bairoch and Etemad (1985) as his primary
sources of export values, I use the recent dataset on export values from Federico (2016) (in
current prices and based on 1913 borders). This new dataset alone oers a deep insight into
export values. I make a few adjustments to this original dataset where necessary. Firstly, I
consider the assumption by Federico that export values in French Equatorial Africa go to zero
prior to 1865 to be too strong. I replace the part of the time series which uses this assumption
by using an average of the growth rates of Nigeria and Angola to extend these export values
back in time.13 The extrapolated export values Federico provides for Liberia are also dependant
upon the transition of French Equatorial Africa. I re-extrapolated these values from 1930, using
the growth rates of French West Africa. I also include the export values for Libya, given by
MacGregor (1847), using a log-linear interpolation between this period and the values in 1910
13While neither are immediate neighbours they are very close. The choice of these countries corresponds to data availability in
the surrounding region and my aim of producing a well balanced dataset.
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(where Federico begins to extrapolate back). This approach of log-linear interpolation follows
the methodology of the existing literature.14 I consider these adjustments an improvement on
the original dataset: this new data incorporates a broad range of literature and weakens the
assumptions made.
Export values given by Federico go as far back as 1817. I make several adjustments to export
values and ITT values to provide a balanced dataset for 51 African countries to 1830. I also nd
that the data from French Equatorial Africa is also somewhat unclear and misleading. Based
on the work by Federico (2016) the export values from French Equatorial Africa correspond
to slightly dierent geographical regions prior to 1910. In the period 1870-1885 I use the
population data of only Gabon to deate the ITT data on the basis of this export data. This
implies that in this short period the ITT of Gabon is essentially used as a proxy for all of
French Equatorial Africa. Before 1870, I use the population values of all regions, allowing for
the inclusion of the slave data.15
I then attempt to extend this dataset. I use the growth rates of export values from the league
of nations between 1938 and 1943 for the countries available (League of Nations (19271943).
I also add historical data from Mitchell (1988) and MacGregor (1847). For Benin, I use the
export values provided by Mitchell (1988) where available.16 In North Africa and Abyssinia
(modern-day Ethiopia), I also incorporate new data available from MacGregor (1847) and
Mitchell (1988)(with the exception of Algeria).17) In Egypt, I include data from both MacGregor
(1847) and Mitchell (1988)). Any gaps within this data are then log-linearly extrapolated. For
Cameroon and Guinea-Bissau I use the growth rate of French West African export values prior
to 1850. I use the growth rate of Mauritius prior to 1850 to proxy for the non-slave exports in
Madagascar. Finally, for Tanzania I extend the export values back from 1850 using the average
growth rates of Mauritius and Mozambique.
World Export prices
Like Prados de la Escosura (2012), I also use the British export price index as a proxy for
world prices. The choice of British export prices is in line with the work of Blattman (2007),
Williamson (2011) and Frankema et al. (2016). Frankema et al, also demonstrate the resilience
14I use log linear interpolations on a number of occasions. The same technique is used by Prados de la Escosura (2012) and
Maddison (2006).
15This implies that all non-slave exports in French Equatorial Africa are equal to nil during this period. This is a rather
strong assumption although given that slaves were by far the primary export it is unlikely to have had a large impact on the
resulting GDP estimates. The main concern is that there is an increased volatility between 1870 and 1910 as a result of the
border changes. Without more data there is little which can be done to resolve this. Thus, volatility in French Equatorial Africa
and, as a result Central Africa, is likely to to somewhat exaggerated.
16Thus reducing the 'group' assumption described earlier, which was made in French West Africa
17In general the gures given by MacGregor(1847), Mitchell(1988), Hanson(1980) and Federico(2016) t well. Algeria is an
exception - the export values from MacGregor are signicantly higher than those provided by Federico (2016). Issawi (1982) also
presents export values for North Africa which dier signicantly. I do not attempt to incorporate these alternative gures.
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of using the British price index by making comparisons with the price index from France.18
From 1970 onwards I use the data from the IMF (2003) CD Rom and prior to 1970 I use the
price index Mitchell (1988).19
ITT (Income Terms of Trade) Adjustments
For regions comprised of more than one modern-day country, I use the respective ITT calculated
of the allocated group to create the individual estimations.20 For Rwanda and Burundi, I use
the ITT of Tanzania when export values are no longer available; for Botswana, I use Namibia;
for Equatorial guinea, I use French Equatorial Africa; for Swaziland, I use Mozambique; for the
Congo, I use Angola; for Botswana and Lesotho I use the ITT of south Africa and for Rhodesia
I use the ITT of Mozambique.
Prior to 1850, I use the ITT of Ethiopia to estimate: Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia; the ITT
of Egypt in Libya and Sudan; the ITT of Algeria for Tunisia and, nally, the ITT of South
Africa for Namibia. I also use the grouping mentioned in the previous section on correcting for
the slave trade. If data is not available for one of these countries I use the remaining data use
the population for the countries covered in the respective region.
Population
From 1950 onwards I use population data from the Maddison Project (2018). My primary
source of historical population is Frankema and Jerven (2014), who produce yearly estimates
for the majority of the African countries between 1850 and 1960. For Cape Verde (1920-1950),
Egypt(1846-1850), Mauritius (1850-1950), São Tomé and Príncipe (1921-1950) and Seychelles
(1891-1950) I use data from Mitchell (1995). Missing years for the data from Mitchell are then
lled in using log-linear interpolation to allow for a balanced dataset. After doing so, I assign
the growth rates specied by Frankema and Jerven (2014) to each respective country, according
to their respective region. Finally, whilst I have a relatively balanced dataset, any remaining
gaps within variables in a period of less than 10 years is log-linearly interpolated.
In the absence of pre-1850 population data for the majority of the African continent I accept
the regional growth estimates from Manning (2014) for the period between 1790 and 1890,
which I use to extend my population estimates before 1850.
18See the African Economic History Network, African Commodity Trade Database (ACTD) 1808-1939: DESCRIPTION OF
METHODS AND NOMENCLATURE.
19Note: in the post-1950 period Prados de la Escosura (2012) uses the "export price", rather than the "export price index"
given by the IMF. I can only assume he does this given it produces a higher R-Squared, since it is theoretically inconsistent.
20This includes: Equatorial Guinea, French West Africa, Rhodesia, Rwanda and Burundi and Kenya and Uganda. Thus
the growth rates for these countries is dierentiated only by the use of the dummy variables explained later on. The countries
included in these groups can be found in Federico (2016).
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Correcting for the Atlantic Slave Trade
The Atlantic slave trade is likely to have had a large economic eect on the regions directly
aected i.e. West and East Africa, but also for Africa as a whole.21 Perhaps the most prevalent
reasons include the impacts of changing population growth rates and export values. Firstly,
the population growth was hampered by the slave trade, and in some years it is postulated
that population declined as a result (Cordell, 1990; Manning, 1987, 2014; Frenkema, 2014).
Secondly, by denition, exports do not include slaves, thus export values will be higher if one
includes the exportation of slave labourers.22 For both of these reasons, if not controlled for,
it is likely that GDP per capita would be under-estimated in slave trade regions prior to the
20th century.
With regards to population change, the existing gures produced by the African Economic
History Network already adjust for the eects of forced migration using methodology based the
work of Manning (2010).23 Hence, it remains to correct the export values by adding the value
of slaves sold.24
Export volumes are readily available from the Atlantic Slave Trade Database. This data has
long been established to have many "missing values" and several papers have attempted to
correct for this (Etlis, 1987a, 1987b; Manning, 2015). Manning (2015) uses Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis as an alternative method of correcting for the missing observations.
The advantage of Manning's methodology is that it both corrects for the missing observations
- with results similar to those predicted by Etlis (1987a, 1987b) - and covers a greater period
of time. I use these MCMC estimates of embarkment as my basis for the number of slaves
exported.
The issue with these estimates is that they are given by port, thus one cannot distinguish
between the countries aected. It is reasonable to assume that ports can be attributed to the
surrounding region. I hence create the following groups on the basis of the ports' locations and
existing export value groupings:
• I assign slaves exported from the ports: Gabon and Loango to French Equatorial Africa.
• I assign the ports: Senegambia, Windward Coast, the Gold Coast, Bight of Biafra and
the Bight of Benin to a new group. That group consists of: the pre-existing French West
Africa group, Togo, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia.
21Despite the abolishment of the slave trade by the British empire in 1807, slave exports remained a large share of African
exports for the rest of the century. Although the peak occurred in the 17601808 era (Frankema et al. (2016), according to my
data slave exports accounted for over 50% of exports in French Equatorial Africa in the early 19th century.
22This is pointed out by Federico (2016). This does not apply to all historical data, however, for example MacGregor (1847).
23See Frankema et al.(2016) - This new dataset considers alternative proxies for the growth rate of African population, as
opposed to the work of Manning (2010). They also make use of the existing census data.
24Note that the population data will be further updated by Manning (Forthcoming) and my results can be easily updated
following the release of this data.
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• The port Angola is assumed to be representative of Angola.
• The ports: South-east Africa and Indian ocean islands are assigned to Mozambique and
Madagascar, also forming a new group.
This adjustment occurs prior to 1870, thus individual countries are more linked together by
their ITT values. Since large areas of West Africa are grouped together, it should be noted
that the GDP per capita estimates provide a close approximation in estimating the region as a
whole, although individual country variations are less well captured.
It then remains necessary to attribute a price to those slaves. The work of Lovejoy (2015)
presents estimates for several dierent regions. He demonstrates that there is no price decrease
following the abolition of the slave trade. I use these prices, according to the respective regions
provided by Lovejoy (2015).25




Step 1: Estimation of the relationship between income terms of trade and GDP
(1950 - 1990)
I begin this section by presenting the results of my estimation period, which are then used in
step 2 to create the indirect GDP estimations. The regression results below are variations of
the equation 3.1 in the period chosen by Prados de la Escosura (2012), from 1950 to 1990.26
There are some subtle dierences between my regression data and that of Prados de la Escosura
(2012). My export values are the same, however I use new data from the Maddison Project
(2018) and use a dierent import price index to deate exports (see the previous section).
Regression Results
The rst, most parsimonious, specication illustrates the signicance of the quadratic relationship
between ITT and GDP per capita. In accordance with the work of Prados de la Escosura
(2012), as well as the adjustments I mention in the methodology (section 3), I then include
additional dummy variables, as found in specications 2-4. Specications 2 and 3 provide an
insight into the eect improvement in the t of the model as a result of dummy variables
and specication 4 includes country xed aects to control for country specic variations.
Comparing specication 3 and 4, it is clear that the inclusion of country xed eects results
has a signicant improvement upon the t of the model. It is important to recognise that the
addition of this xed eects element controls for all of the between country variation. Thus,
the remainder of this variation occurs through the time variation. (In the summary statistics
in Appendix A, it is demonstrated that around half of the variation in ITT is made up of
the variation in time, the other half is comprised of the country variation.)27 Unlike the time
xed eects included by Prados de la Escosura (2012), country xed eects can be used in the
pre-1950, "out-of-sample" period. Given, the improved explanatory power of the xed eects
model (and that the colonial dummy variables are redundant in the pre-colonial period) I choose
the fourth specication, which controls for all country individual variation. This xed element
essentially uses current average GDP per capita as an instrument of historical GDP per capita.
Despite the adjustments to the original model by Prados de la Escosura (2012), and that
I take advantage of all available data (my observation number is 1690 compared to 301) I
nd similar results to those of Prados de la Escosura (2012). All of the variables remain
26The estimation period was limited to 1990 to avoid the change in regime following the widespread onset of aids (Prados de
la Escosura, 2012).
27I owe this note to Vicente Royuela Mora.
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Table 5.1: OLS Regression Results
OLS Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(ITT) -0.420*** -1.347*** -1.429*** -1.080***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.042)
log(ITT)2 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
RR * log(ITT) -0.046*** -0.035*** -0.047*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.022)
COAST * log(ITT) 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.084***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.022)








Country Fixed Eects No No No Yes
R-squared(Adj) 0.484 0.644 0.721 0.928
N 1690 1690 1690 1690
All estimations use robust standard errors. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Data sources/Denitions GDPPC: GDP per capita ((2011 $ US Dollars -
as given by the Maddison Project (2018)) (in logs).
ITT: Income Terms of Trade per Head (in logs). Data sources: IMF (2003)
CD Rom and Maddison Project (2018).
RR data source: United Nations [World Economic Situation and Prospects
(WESP)] - Statistical Annex (2014)).
NORTH: see regional denitions in Appendix A.
Colony (British/French) data source: (Bertocchi and Canova 2002).
statistically signicant (using robust standard errors) with the same signs found by Prados
de La Esosura. This is consistent even after controlling for country xed eects (with the
exception of the dummy variable for French colonies). Like Prados de la Escosura I test this
regression specication using dierent variations e.g. dierent estimation periods (1960-1990
and 1950-2000), and the inclusion of time xed eects. Results do not change and the model
produces good estimates in the out-of-sample period.
Finally, given that this regression is not concerned with econometric issues, such as endogeneity,
I do not attempt to control for this factor. The regression merely establishes the best t to the
creation of the indirect estimations.
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Step 2: Estimating GDP Per Capita
Having established the relationship between income terms of trade and GDP I am able to use
my historical ITT values to create GDP estimates. This is a straightforward process in which
I plug ITT into the corresponding regression. Doing so generates GDP per capita estimates on
the basis of ITT and the respective dummy variables.
Given the data and adjustments described thus far, I am able to produce regional results as
far back as 1830. Prior to 1830 there is information for only a few individual countries. My
GDP per capita estimates in Egypt and Libya, for example, extend back until 1796. I make
use of this last data by extending my North African GDP per capita estimates back another 34
years based on the average growth rates of these two countries. This might be justied based
on the fact that Egypt contributed to a large part of North Africa's total GDP. This remains,
of course, a relatively strong assumption. I identify later on the use of a VECM time series
procedure to produce forecasts back in time from 1830. This is done, mainly, to support my
arguments regarding the trend in GDP per capita prior to 1880. These forecasts can also be
seen test of robustness of these nal indirect estimations in North Africa.28
Main Findings
I nd two periods of elevated GDP per capita in Africa - one occurring prior to 1890, and the
other prior to 1840. The decadal results for each country are presented in Appendix B and in
the gure 5.2 I present the evolution of regional GDP per capita. (In the excel le mentioned
country estimates are provided on a yearly basis.)
From gure 5.2, it is clear to see that during the 20th Century, GDP per capita growth rates
remained relatively stable until the 1980's, when GDP Per capita began to decline.29 A slight
peak can be identied in Central, West and Southern Africa during the First World War period.
This was primarily the result of a change in the world prices. Given the small size of this peak
I consider it as somewhat negligible, although this could be representative of a shift towards
African produces when European production was impeded by the war eorts.
One of the more notable results is that between 1860 and 1890 there was a boom in Central,
West and East Africa. This coincided with the short-lived commodity price increase observed
by Frankema et al. (2016). The cause of these circumstances is explained by the authors as
being the result of a shift in the structural change of Africa after the end of the transatlantic
slave trade. The authors state that:
28As shown in the time series procedure in Appendix B, the trend of the North African indirect estimations and forecasts are
similar.
29According to Maddison (2011), using my regional denitions, this decline occurred at a rate over just over 1% per year.
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"The gradual abolition of the African slave trades and the transition to commodity
exports halted the continuous drain on already-scarce labor and spurred land-extensive
tropical agriculture engaging smallholder family farms, communal farms, and large
estates."
This peak in economic prosperity in late 19th century, resulting from the boom in commodity
prices, can be considered the main driving factor of the land-grab of European powers in the
so-called "scramble for Africa".30 In fact, Frankema et al. (2016) suggest that this increase in
relative prices between 1853 and 1885 "accounted for one-third of the export value growth to
Britain" and "55 percent of the export value growth to France". This export value growth in
turn resulted in the short run period of high GDP per capita levels in the sub-Saharan Africa
(relative to the early 20th century).
In almost all parts of the African continent, within the 1830s, when exports were more oriented
towards the trade of slaves, GDP per capita levels were also found to be higher. Since slave
export volumes, and more specically the value of slave exports, continued to rise going further
back in time, the continuation of this trend is to be expected.31 And, given the extraction of
human capital, GDP per capita did not revolve around subsistence rates, as occurs in a typical
Malthusian economy. I support this surprising result from the 1830s by forecasting back in
time - extending the regional estimations another 34 years. To do so, I take advantage of the
non-stationary cointegrated nature of the GDP per capita estimates and I use a vector error
correction model to generate forecasts (see Appendix B). The forecasts indicate the continuation
of this trend, most notably in West Africa and East Africa (the regions most heavily impacted
by the slave trade).3233 Even regions which were not directly aected by the slave trade might
have indirectly beneted from the higher income of neighbouring regions. The higher GDP per
capita levels in Southern Africa were also, in part, driven by the higher incomes in South Africa
(Fourie and Van Zanden, 2016).
I have argued that both of these periods of elevated GDP per capita levels might have stemmed
from the rise and fall of the slave trade in Africa. This is not the rst case in which this has
been proposed. The high GDP per capita growth approximations from Manning (1982), in
Dahomey (present-day Benin), were also attributed to increasing export values resulting from
the slave trade. Similarly, this would not be the rst time in which population decline, due to
external factors, has increased growth. For instance, the Black Death crisis is well established
30As is argued by Frankema et al.(2016). The authors also explain that world trade was also accelerated by the revolution
in transport, a transition to more liberal trade policy in Europe, and the expansion in world GDP growth associated with the
industrial revolution.
31See, for instance, Frankema et al. (2016), price data from the Lovejoy (2015) and export volumes from Manning (2015) and
Etlis (1987a, 1987b)
32I include these forecasts in table 5.2 and gure 5.2 - as indicated.
33It should also be noted that some of the early statistics from MacGregor (1847) also include some slave exports. Given I use
this source for much of North Africa's early export data, this might help to explain the slightly higher level of GDP per capita
estimations in North Africa prior to 1840.
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to have instigated the strong growth levels within England (Broadberry, 2010).
The intermediate period between 1840 and 1860 might be consider a stagnation period, in
Table 5.2: Regional GDP per Capita Indirect Estimations
YEAR North Africa West Africa East Africa Central Africa Southern Africa Total Africa
1800 1574 1390* 1038* 603* 1118* 1150*
1810 1559 1302* 976* 605* 1052* 1092*
1820 1446 1213* 914* 607* 987* 1024*
1830 1340 1082 850 614 921 938
1840 856 791 668 543 822 725
1850 745 839 671 544 710 707
1860 665 811 601 670 634 671
1870 743 1145 635 581 658 763
1880 825 1123 601 574 703 766
1890 965 1211 657 729 778 861
1900 1153 1043 702 708 851 881
1910 1416 1067 651 720 1114 972
1920 1547 1344 800 871 1250 1160
1930 1936 1413 839 984 1444 1313
1938 2223 1575 916 1091 1663 1490
1950 2679 1898 979 1373 3105 1970
1960 3025 2176 1120 1653 4244 2384
1970 4187 2640 1297 1966 4469 2900
1980 6206 3903 1445 2146 6097 4047
1990 6065 3662 1552 2136 5734 3876
2000 5239 4460 2109 3046 7672
Full results can be found in the Excel le at https://sites.google.com/site/lukeamcleary/home.
*FORECASTS - based on the VECM procedure outlined in Appendix B. The alternative VECM forecasts
for North Africa can be found in the Excel le mentioned. Prior to 1830, Total Africa refers to the indirect
estimations from North Africa and the forecasts of the other countries. estimations.
which structural adjustment occurred. During this period the economies had to adjust to higher
population growth rates as the extraction of human capital came to a halt and workers had
to acquire new skills to take on the challenge of of meeting means with a denser population
and a reduction in slave revenue.34 35 A similar explanation for this stagnation is suggested by
Hopkins (1973), and later Jerven (2010), namely that the end of the slave trade resulted in a
loss of state power and centralisation, referred to as the "the crisis of adaptation".
Within Central Africa, gure 5.2 would suggest that there were two peaks. As I have noted
in the data compilation section, border changes lead to misleading results, This rst boom is
likely of little signicances - the result of the border changes, the eect of which cannot be
controlled for further given current data availability. It is the second boom which is of interest.
This second boom occurred slightly after that of West Africa, around the same time as it
occurs in East Africa. Given that Frankema et al. (2016) states that the rise in commodity
prices occurred slightly later in these regions than in West Africa, this seems to conrm the
relationship between these growth estimations and the commodity boom. The trend of pre-1840
East Africa is also notably steep a result of the unprecedented rise of incomes in the British
34The change in population growth rates in my dataset occurs in 1850 as I switch between growth rates provided by Manning
(2010) and Frankema et al. (2016) (as described in the previous section).
35A relevant discussion is the work of Dalrymple-Smith (2017), who shows that need for slave provisions had a minimal
demand-boosting eect on the demand for agriculture in West Africa, particularly over time.
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Figure 5.1: Indirect Estimates vs Prados de la Escosura (2012)
See Appendix A for the exchange rate conversion
colonies in Eastern Africa - this in turn can be attributed to the thriving trade in Mauritius.36
which, for reasons I explain later on, was relatively prosperous during this period.
To summarise these ndings, as would be expected, my historical estimates show a general
upwards trend throughout the 20th century until the late 1980s, in line with Prados de la
Escosura (2012) (see gure 5.1). The dierences between the estimations in recent years can
be primarily attributed to the update in Maddison data used. I am also better able to capture
volatility. Prior to 1930, I predict a lower GDP per capita than that of Prados de la Escosura
(2012) as a result of the trend variable that I have included. However, by the early 1830s it is
clear that my GDP per capita estimates start to surpass the downwards trend one might expect
from the results of Prados de la Escosura (2012). It should be also be noted that whilst GDP
per capita is a measure of living standards this is certainly not suggestive that living standards
of the general populations improved.
36The export values from Mauritius are used by Federico (2016) to extrapolate the export values of British East Africa i.e.
Kenya and Uganda, from 1895 to 1828.
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REGIONAL GDP PER CAPITA (1796-1990)
(a) North Africa (b) West Africa
(c) East Africa (d) Central Africa
(e) Southern Africa
Figure 5.2: Regional GDP Per Capita
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6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Prados de la Escosura (2012) uses real wages to test his results. Using data on real wages
and "welfare ratios" (a labourers earnings deated by the costs of sustaining a family) from
Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012), Prados de la Escosura (2012) generates what might
be considered the cost of living within British Africa. Under the standard framework of a
Malthusian economy one might expect the indirect estimates from Prados de la Escosura (2012)
to follow a similar long-run trend to that of this cost of living. And, indeed, this is the case. Since
the wage data is only available from 1880, within the time frame of Prados de la Escosura's
estimations, and since my results are similar to his, I do not repeat the same tests in vain.
Instead, I embark on performing my own robustness checks: data comparisons (post-1950 and
pre-1950) and historical verications.
Comparison with available data
It remains questionable whether the assumptions of the GDP-ITT relationship remain constant
outside of the estimation period. This is dicult to prove, since there are few reliable historical
estimates prior to 1950 (other than those produced by Prados de la Escosura (2012)). The most
reliable estimates available in Africa are those produced by Fourie and Van Zanden (2016) in
South Africa. They use a combination of national accounts and other estimates to produce these
GDP estimates, which are the highest quality estimations available in Africa prior to 1950. I
compare my estimates with those of South Africa in gure 6.1 to judge the predictive power
of my model throughout time. I nd that my estimates are relatively robust. My estimates
follow the general trend of the estimations from Fourie and Van Zanden (2016) rather well.
However, in the 18th century their results are slightly higher than my 95% condence intervals.
It should be noted that whilst South African estimates are not necessarily perfect, they are
the best existing estimates in 19th century Africa. Thus, the slight under-prediction might not
necessarily be indicative of a downwards bias in my own results. In general, I take this result
as evidence in support of my own estimates.
Comparison with historical events
This thesis has shown the possibility of a pre-1900 boom in sub-Saharan Africa. This would
seem to concur with other economic analyses, such as Frankema et al. (2018), who have
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Figure 6.1: Comparisons with other estimations in South Africa
Data taken from Maddison (2018), which incorporates the work of Fourie and Van Zanden (2016). I compute
condence intervals computed based on the RMSE from the regression results.
suggested that there was a boom in export prices. I provide a few case studies of countries
which seem to coincide and support my ndings of the income booms which occurred during
the 19th century. In some cases they do, however, question the strength of these estimates on
a country basis.
The rst example of an economy which grew rich from slavery is Dahomey (modern-day Benin).
Manning (1982) and Jerven (2010) point out that, during the 18th century, export revenues
in Dahomey were similar to those in Great Britain at the time. In fact, to give a somewhat
anecdotal example of its wealth, the kingdom built the worlds largest earthworks prior to the
mechanical era. 37 Manning also shows that this export revenue dwindles during the early 19th
century, its export revenue grow did not pick up again until the end of the century. This is a
clear example of a region which had capitalised upon the slave trade directly beneted from
the slave trade. This supports the strengths of the high levels of regional GDP per capita in
the 18th and early 19th century, however, it also highlights the fragility of my country based
estimates in the pre-1870 slave trade era. Export values in Benin, most importantly its export
revenue from slaves, are included in the total export values of French West Africa, amongst
other countries (see the data section for details). Thus, the export values, and henceforth GDP
37See https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/mar/18/story-of-cities-5-benin-city-edo-nigeria-mighty-medieval-capital-lost-without-trace
which quotes the Guinness Book of World Records (1974).
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per capita levels presented in Benin can be considered undervalued.38
Mauritius was another country which had a robust slave trade long prior to slavery. Whilst
other African countries were slow to adjust after the transatlantic Slave Trade as they moved
away from a slave-based society, Mauritius, had been a trading island for a long time, it is likely
then that it had the prerequisites necessary to switch to indentured labourers and increase its
agricultural production.39 The island was also "oered generous terms of capitulation" by the
British colonizers at the time.40 As a result of these factors, the island quickly adjusted to the
decline in slave demands by switching to the production of other products. Between the years
1825 and 1835 sugar production increased threefold (Suzuki, 2017). Again, this supports the
evidence of higher income levels during the peak of the transatlantic slave trade.
An example of the trade boom have a positive economic impact in the late 19th century is the
cocoa boom, which impacted Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria (Jerven, 2010). Austin (2005)
develops the idea of how part of Ghana's growth after the slave trade could be attributed to
the Cocoa boom in Ghana.41
Discussion
I would argue that this approach to indirectly measuring GDP per capita is certainly preferred
to previous guesses, however, the very much stringent assumption remains - the assumption
that the relationship between income terms of trade and GDP holding over time.
I expect, based on theory and results, that any bias is likely to be downwards, my estimations
are more likely to under-estimate than over-estimate going back in time. This is supported by
the comparisons made earlier in this thesis. I also present a number of hypothetical reasons for
this, including:
• Commerce with immediate neighbours might have had more importance as a proportion
of total trade when trade costs were higher. The historical trade statistics are typically
derived from colonial records, thus focus on the sea-bound Afro-European trade.(Federico,
2016; Frankema et al, 2018)
• Data scarcity might become a problem towards later years. This problem originates in
the original historical sources, but also assumptions made in the aggregation of these
38Tadei (2017) shows how extractive institutions in French Africa depressed the prices of African trade below what would have
been paid in a counter-factual competitive market. This, implied undervalued exports of other members of this group. Given this
undervaluation the large export values from Benin should "cancel out" to some extent.
39Arab sailors rst began trading with the island in 900 AD. Since that period, Portuguese, Dutch, French and British
colonisers each established institutions on the island. (https://sites.stanford.edu/MauritianArchaeology/history)
40Ibid.
41See Austin (2007) which provides a more in-depth insight of the economic structural change which occurred in Ghana
following end of the Atlantic slave trade.
21
Rethinking Africa's GDP, 1796-1950
sources can be problematic.42 The data from Federico, for example, at times makes strong
assumptions.43
These speculations are supported by my ndings. Comparisons, which I have presented with
previous historical estimates in South Africa prior to 1900 suggest that my indirect estimations
are too low, particularly prior to 1850. (I present my comparison with South Africa in the next
section). Secondly, it is apparent based on my individual country estimates in Appendix B that
the estimations of many of the countries fell below the subsistence level for a prolonged period
(GDP per capita levels are truncated by the subsistence level, $515). I conclude from this that
any bias would most likely act downwards. Despite this potential downwards bias, one can
assume that any under-prediction increases going further back in time, thus the conclusion of
the thesis, most notably, the economic booms early and late 19th century should hold.
42E.g. colonial blue books and historical abstracts - see Frankema et al. (2016) Excel le for examples of raw data sources




In this thesis, I have made a signicant contribution to the existing literature which aims to
bridge together a deeper understanding of historical Africa and address the question of whether
Africa has always been poor. Using new data, the inclusion of the transatlantic slave trade and
through the use of time series techniques, I have been able to produce regional estimates and
forecasts of GDP and GDP per capita Africa from 1796 to 2000. I have also produced country
based estimates from 1830 onwards (these decadal estimations are available in Appendix B).
My results overall show during the 20th century the most disappointing period of economic
growth occurred in the last 1980's/early 1990's. In the 19th century, however the growth story
was very dierent, consisting of two periods of high GDP per capita levels. I endeavour to
explain these booms based on the structural changes at the time. The rst, occurring near the
peak of the slave trade period (pre-1840) and, the second, in the 1850-1890 period. I explain
that this rst boom was caused by the higher export levels and lower population resulting from
the slave trade. As the slave trade grinded to a halt the drain on labour came to an end the
economy shifted to a more land-intensive agricultural based economy. This was accompanied
by a stagnation in economic growth. After a couple of generations, this in turn resulted in a
commodity boom, triggering an economic boom in West, East and Central Africa. I argue that
the rise in commodity prices made way for a second economic boom during this period.
Finally, based upon the trend in slave exports, my estimates for North Africa and the time
series estimates produced in Appendix A, I expect a higher level of GDP per capita in the late
18th century than that of Africa in the mid 19th century. Overall, I demonstrate that Africa's
economic history has been far from the at GDP per capita progression encompassed under the
assumptions generally assumed of a Malthusian economy. The conclusion can be drawn from
this that Africa has not always been poor. I show that dierent regions and countries exhibited
years in which GDP per capita far exceeds subsistence levels.
In a nal note, throughout this paper, I do not discuss the distribution of these elevated output
levels amongst Africans and, indeed, the Europeans population in Africa. Furthermore, the
lucrative nature of transatlantic slave trade should be considered as a rent-seeking activity.
When considering the potential benets derived from the slave trade one also ought to consider
the long lasting negative impacts. (Nunn, 2008).
Possible Extensions
In an attempt to continue to build a clearer picture of GDP Estimates in historical Africa,
and indeed, in any region where estimates are not available there are a range of possibilities.
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The results have also demonstrated a dynamic regional evolution within Africa during the 19th
century. Moving forward, this research can be developed in various ways: the inclusion of more
dummies, for instance, dummies considering war/conict and political instability would seem to
improve the quality of the estimates.44 It is also possible to develop new techniques to estimate
GDP per capita. This thesis, for instance, has utilised trade data. There is, however, a wealth
of trade data extending as far back as 1699 (Johnson, 1990). The type of data, however, was
not directly useful in computing the income terms of trade variable used. Future studies might
be able to calculate alternative specications of terms of trade and other variables to create a
new indirect technique of measuring GDP per capita. This poses another question. How far
back can/should one estimate back in time by extending current data?
An alternative to extending data backwards would be the use of creating historical benchmarks
(much like those used by the Maddison Project). I mentioned in the introduction that work was
being done in the way of translating manuscripts. Whilst, the manuscripts which are currently
being translated are more in the way of poems and stories, it is possible that with time more
historical records become available. I also considered exploring the use of the cross-sectional
data connecting the value of "state-hood" with GDP.45
Finally, it seems relatively clear to me that GDP and population should be measured together
(rather population being exogenous), since it is clear that both are interlinked. The occurrence
of these economic booms found in my estimations should be considered when calculating
population growth rates. (One would expect this to have increased the rate of population
growth, this in turn might have reduced the duration of the periods of economic prosperity.)
This might be done through the creation of a simple simultaneous equation in which population
change was determined by GDP per capita. On this occasion, the statistical signicance of GDP
on population was too low for me to justify this procedure.
.
44This would be appropriate in Africa given the number of atrocities and degree political stability during the estimation
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Following the work of Prados de la Escosura (2012), I dene North, Central, East and Southern
Africa in accordance with the African Development Bank.
North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
Central Africa: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.
East Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles,
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Ethiopia includes Eritrea and Sudan includes South
Sudan, since these regions have only gained independence in recent years).
West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. I
do not have data to include São Tomé and Príncipe.
Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Exchange Rates
When adjusting export prices from pounds sterling or francs I use the rates given by Federico
(2016). These conversion rates are in line with the work of Bohlin (2010) and Lobell (2010).
I convert the data from Prados de la Escosura (2012) from 1990 $ US dollars to 2011$ US
dollars using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index (CPI). I nd the
physiological subsistence level of $300 used by Prados de la Escosura (2012) to be equivalent
to $516.31 in 2011. I use the value $515 as an approximation.
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Figure 1: Historical Map of Africa
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APPENDIX B
Figure 2: Log GDP per capita and the log of terms of trade
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Overall Between Within
GDP 2046 2778 3868 3326 084 373 43624
ITT 1857 626 1488 1087 989 7 21088
COAST 2460 0.6 0.5 0.5 0 0 1
RR 2255 0.3 0.5 0.5 0 0 1
British Colony 2460 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 1
French Colony 2460 0.3 0.5 0.5 0 0 1
TREND 1857 270 12 0 12 250 290
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TIME SERIES PROCEDURE (1796-1830)
To extend the regional estimates outside of Africa I use time series techniques to create forecasts.
I use the period 1830-1870 as the estimation period on the basis that the introduction of slave
exports might cause a structural change. Based on the following tests I conclude that all regions
follow an order of integration of order 1 and are cointegrated.
Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test
Variable ADF Test Level Critical Value 5% Order of Integration
North Africa -0.842 -3.536
First dierence -5.201 -3.536 I(1)
West Africa -2.636 -3.536
First dierence -7.643 -3.536 I(1)
East Africa -0.500 -3.536
First dierence -7.419 -3.536 I(1)
Central Africa -1.242 -3.536
First dierence -5.805 -3.536 I(1)
Southern Africa -2.495 -3.536
First dierence -6.067 -3.536 I(1)
All tests include a trend.
Table 3: VECM Lag Selection
Sample years: 1830 - 1870 Number of obs: 40
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 3.0e+17 54.4221 54.4989 54.6398
1 -868.346 266.93 25 0.000 8.6e+14 48.5592 49.0197* 49.8654*
2 -842.247 52.199 25 0.001 8.7e+14 48.4998 49.344 50.8944
3 -815.836 52.822 25 0.001 1.0e+15 48.4235 49.6515 51.9066
4 -777.397 76.877* 25 0.000 7.7e+14* 47.6971* 49.3088 52.2687
Endogenous: westafrica eastafrica southernafrica northafrica centralafrica
Exogenous: _cons
I choose the most parsimonious model: a lag of 1 based on the HQIC and SBIC
selection criteria.
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Table 4: Johansen Test for Cointegration
Trend: Constant Lags=1
Sample years: 1830 - 1870 Number of obs: 40
Maximum Rank Parms LL Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value
0 5 -992.33178 . 109.7523 68.52
1 14 -952.80532 0.86142 30.6994* 47.21
2 21 -943.03055 0.38660 11.1499 29.68
3 26 -939.17375 0.17539 3.4363 15.41
4 29 -937.54456 0.07823 0.1779 3.76
5 30 -937.45561 0.00444
Endogenous: westafrica eastafrica southernafrica northafrica centralafrica
Exogenous: _cons
Table 5: Vector Error Correction Model
Sample: 1830-1870 No. of obs = 41
AIC = 49.5789
Log likelihood = -1002.367 HQIC = 49.79197
Det(Sigma_ml) = 1.18e+15 SBIC = 50.16402
Equation Parms RMSE R-Squared Chi2 P>Chi2
D_westafrica 2 53.7023 0.4105 27.15918 0.0000
D_eastafrica 2 19.9771 0.0835 3.555326 0.1690
D_southernafrica 2 33.2878 0.0415 1.68757 0.4301
D_northafrica 2 62.6566 0.0569 2.351131 0.3086
D_centralafrica 2 24.0114 0.0130 .5145572 0.7732
Table 6: Vector Error Correction Model Cont.
Coecient Standard Error Z P>|Z| [95% Condence Interval]
D_westafrica
L1. -.5216953 .1001385 -5.21 0.000 -.7179632 -.3254274
Constant -.3088797 8.38833 -0.04 0.971 -16.7497 16.13194
D_eastafrica
L1. -.0208208 .0372512 -0.56 0.576 -.0938317 .0521902
Constant 5.650707 3.120429 1.81 0.070 -.4652218 11.76663
D_southernafrica
L1. -.0479133 .0620717 -0.77 0.440 -.1695715 .0737449
Constant 5.506385 5.199573 1.06 0.290 -4.684591 15.69736
D_northafrica
L1. .0142333 .1168356 0.12 0.903 -.2147603 .243227
Constant 14.93466 9.787003 1.53 0.127 -4.247513 34.11683
D_centralafrica
L1. .0319265 .044774 0.71 0.476 -.055829 .119682
Constant .2433843 3.750599 0.06 0.948 -7.107654 7.594422
Table 7: Cointegrating Equation
Equation Parms Chi2 P>chi2
_ce1 4 43.63556 0.0000
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Table 8: Johansen normalization restriction imposed
beta Coecient Standard Error Z P>|Z| [95% Condence Interval]
_ce1
West Africa 1 . . . . .
Eastern Africa -1.309248 .4879218 -2.68 0.007 -2.265557 -.352939
Southern Africa .0665138 .2273371 0.29 0.770 -.3790587 .5120864
North Africa -.0483495 .15826 -0.31 0.760 -.3585334 .2618345
Central Africa -.692243 .2649145 -2.61 0.009 -1.211466 -.1730202
Constant 428.1429 . . . . .
Figure 3: VECM Forecasts
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INDIRECT GDP PER CAPITA ESTIMATIONS
Table 9: Indirect GDP Per Capita Estimations
YEAR 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1938 1950
ALGERIA 1532 1857 2370 2572 3520 4039 4732
ANGOLA 515 515 527 720 716 807
BENIN 708 604 700 912 1020 1230
BOTSWANA 528 583 625 744 939 1145 1344
BURKINAFASO 836 650 685 861 918 1033 1378
BURUNDI 515 515 515 580 979 789 790
CAMEROON 651 643 603 708 805 886 860
CAPE VERDE 563 695 810 781 1035 1100 1138
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 548 601 539 701 704 786 1163
CHAD 541 593 532 692 695 775 1240
CONGO 611 670 628 788 820 911 1181
DJIBOUTI 1036 1334 2782 2708 4726 3408 4255
DRC 762 699 774 916 1083 1201 1674
EGYPT 695 841 1059 1178 1412 1593 1983
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 863 823 690 838 957 1039 832
ERITREA 515 615 712 783 938 1118
ETHIOPIA 515 515 515 745 697 752 665
GABON 2187 2396 2030 2762 2656 2975 3968
GAMBIA 629 766 991 1179 1424 1335 1829
GHANA 602 673 780 909 1201 1378 2322
GUINEA 749 543 555 726 746 845 1222
GUINEA-BISSAU 515 515 555 637 752 835 486
IVORY COAST 770 678 755 880 1006 1117 1737
KENYA 1084 1167 723 827 929 1067 1372
LESOTHO 515 515 515 515 601 685 398
LIBERIA 515 515 515 515 515 515 761
LIBYA 2594 3097 3524 3043 3274 3786 2976
MADAGASCAR 515 515 515 548 650 772 947
MALAWI 771 619 515 544 575 639 907
MALI 515 515 515 515 515 515 1264
MAURITANIA 783 568 580 759 780 884 770
MAURITIUS 1007 1251 1612 1856 2087 2613 3192
MOROCCO 911 1065 1177 1368 1593 1863 2712
MOZAMBIQUE 632 666 689 919 892 993 466
NAMIBIA 663 747 1008 1138 1468 1819 3258
NIGER 670 521 549 689 736 827 1148
NIGERIA 1717 1451 1445 1828 1885 2093 1503
REUNION
RWANDA 515 515 515 515 808 651 607
SÃO TOMÉ & P 667 957 1399 847 1171 1213 1142
SENEGAL 736 648 721 841 961 1067 2325
SEYCHELLES 1916 2394 3286 3131 4440 4398 4932
SIERRA LEONE 568 656 730 856 992 1158 1757
SOMALIA 515 582 678 821 891 1008
SOUTH AFRICA 1266 1495 2368 2261 2719 3045 5278
SUDAN 738 858 981 1040 1064 1191 1770
SWAZILAND 515 515 515 515 515 529 738
TANZANIA 569 619 680 803 904 1036 1263
TOGO 515 515 541 631 721 800 907
TUNISIA 681 805 987 1117 1451 1635 1619
UGANDA 1059 1150 564 659 671 754 1185
ZAMBIA 643 653 515 683 715 841 1042
ZIMBABWE 1187 1222 1050 1333 1467 1823 1967
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Table 10: Indirect GDP Per Capita Estimations Continued
YEAR 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
ALGERIA 3232 1897 1334 985 1122
ANGOLA 515 515 515 515 515
BENIN 640 515 515 515 572
BOTSWANA 552 515 515 636 515
BURKINAFASO 816 564 603 573 666
BURUNDI 515 515 515 515 515
CAMEROON 631 515 515 515 682
CAPE VERDE 515 515 515
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 652 515 515 778 515
CHAD 643 515 515 767 515
CONGO 687 515 515 819 545
DJIBOUTI 1653 1348 560 610 732
DRC 515 515 515 579 515
EGYPT 995 696 515 515 515 515 515 515
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 911 605 645 603 954
ERITREA 792 646 515 515 515
ETHIOPIA 622 515 515 515 515
GABON 2787 1870 1932 3331 1993
GAMBIA 796 591 634 620 515
GHANA 708 526 564 551 522
GUINEA 763 515 540 515 592
GUINEA-BISSAU 515 515 515 515 515
IVORY COAST 696 517 554 542 622
KENYA 2212 1468 1262 954 1072
LESOTHO 515 515 515 515 515
LIBERIA 515 515 515 515 515 515
LIBYA 2613 1828 1184 1025 1315 1398 1725 2068
MADAGASCAR 515 586 515 515 515
MALAWI 2247 1221 1053 743 825
MALI 515 515 515 515 515
MAURITANIA 798 529 565 528 619
MAURITIUS 515 515 515 521 640
MOROCCO 1104 587 644 605 762
MOZAMBIQUE 684 835 629 562 546
NAMIBIA 590 515 515 695 564
NIGER 653 515 515 515 533
NIGERIA 1447 1033 1105 1063 1678
REUNION 625 515 515 515
RWANDA 515 515 515 515 515
SÃO TOMÉ & P 515 515 515
SENEGAL 665 515 529 518 594
SEYCHELLES 1073 1001 1083 1045 1274
SIERRA LEONE 790 563 603 580 515
SOMALIA 792 646 515 515 515
SOUTH AFRICA 1032 677 823 781 900
SUDAN 1120 737 515 515 515 755 629 694
SWAZILAND 515 515 515 515 515
TANZANIA 569 515 515 515 515
TOGO 515 515 515 515 515
TUNISIA 1412 515 515 515 576
UGANDA 2480 1554 1302 930 1063
ZAMBIA 850 1081 735 615 568
ZIMBABWE 1461 1831 1291 1107 1041
All GDP estimates are truncated using the same physiological subsistence level used by
Prados de la Escosura (2012). ($300 US 1990 DOLLARS is approximately equal to $515
2011 DOLLARS.)
Full results can be found in the Excel le at: https://sites.google.com/site/lukeamcleary/home.
This Excel le also includes GDP estimations.
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